In this paper, we investigate the effects of a trusted relay node on the secrecy of the broadcast channel by considering the model of relay broadcast channel with confidential messages (RBC-CM). Inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region of the RBC-CM are provided, and the capacity results are further explained via a degraded Gaussian example, which we call the degraded Gaussian relay broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages. Numerical results show that this trusted relay node helps to enhance the security of the Gaussian broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages.
wiretapper, while the confidential message was only allowed to be obtained by the legitimate receiver. This model is called the broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC). The capacity-equivocation region of the discrete memoryless BCC was determined in [3] , and the capacity-equivocation region of the Gaussian BCC was determined in [4] . By using the approach of [1] and [3] , Liu et al. [5] studied the broadcast channel with two confidential messages (no common message), and Xu et al. [6] studied the broadcast channel with two confidential messages and one common message. Both of them provided inner and outer bounds on the capacityequivocation regions.
Due to the open nature of the wireless media, the wireless communication is susceptible to eavesdropping. Recently, the security of the wireless networks receives a lot attention. For the multiple-access channel (MAC), Liang and Poor [12] studied the MAC with confidential messages, where the degraded version of the MAC output is available at the transmitters. Each transmitter treats the other one as a wiretapper, and wishes to keep its confidential message as secret as possible from the wiretapper. Inner and outer bounds on capacityequivocation region is provided for this model, and the results are further explained via a Gaussian example. Other related works on the MAC with secrecy constraint are in [13] [14] [15] . For the interference channel, Liu et al. [5] studied the interference channel with two confidential messages, and provided inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region. Liang et al. [16] studied the cognitive interference channel with one common message and one confidential message, and Zaidi et al. [17] investigated the secure communication over the multi-input multi-output (MIMO) X-channel with asymmetric output feedback and delayed CSI at the transmitters. For the relay channel, Lai and El Gamal [18] studied the effects of an additional trusted relay node on the secrecy of the wiretap channel, where a source wished to send messages to a destination while leveraging the help of a trusted relay node to hide those messages from the wiretapper. Three inner bounds (with respect to decode-and-forward (DF), noise-andforward (NF) and compress-and-forward (CF) strategies) and one outer bound on the capacity-equivocation region were provided in [18] . Of particular interest is the NF strategy, where the relay node sends codewords independent of the message to confuse the wiretapper. Lai and El Gamal [18] showed that this NF strategy significantly improved the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel. Based on the work of [18] , Tang et. al. [19] improved Lai and El Gamal's NF strategy by considering an additional case that both the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper could not decode the relay codeword, and in this case, the relay codeword was served as interference for 1556-6013 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. both the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper. Other related works in the relay channel with secrecy constraint include Oohama's relay channel with confidential messages [20] , where an un-trusted relay helps the transmission of messages from one sender to one receiver, and Awan et al.'s secure communication over the parallel relay channel [21] . Recently, Ekrem and Ulukus [22] investigated the effects of user cooperation on the secrecy of broadcast channels by considering a cooperative relay broadcast channel. They showed that user cooperation can increase the achievable secrecy rate region of [5] .
In cellular and WiFi data networks, security is a critical issue when people wish to transmit important/private information, such as credit card transactions or banking related data communications. Another important issue in cellular and WiFi data networks is that the mobile users have been demanding increasingly higher down-link data rate. Combining these two issues, how to achieve higher down-link secrecy data rate motivates us to study the down-link or broadcast channel that exploits the techniques of relaying and user cooperation to achieve higher secrecy rate. In this paper, we study the model of relay broadcast channel with confidential messages (RBC-CM), see Figure 1 . We want to know whether the secrecy capacity region of the broadcast channel can be enhanced by using a trusted relay node.
Inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region of the model of Figure 1 are provided. The inner bounds are constructed according to the decode-and-forward (DF) and noise-and-forward (NF) strategies. Here note that in [18] , Lai and El Gamal has already shown that the compress-andforward (CF) strategy is a combination of the NF strategy and the classical Cover-El Gamal's CF strategy [10] , and it performs no better than the NF strategy. Therefore, the CF inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region of Figure 1 is not considered in this paper. The capacity results of the model of Figure 1 are further explained via a degraded Gaussian example, which we call the degraded Gaussian relay broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages. The numerical results show that a trusted relay node helps to enhance the security of the Gaussian BCC [4] .
In this paper, random variab1es, sample values and alphabets are denoted by capital letters, lower case letters and calligraphic letters, respectively. A similar convention is applied to the random vectors and their sample values. For example, U N denotes a random N-vector (U 1 , . . . , U N ), and u N = (u 1 , . . . , u N ) is a specific vector value in U N that is the Nth Cartesian power of U. U N i denotes a random N − i + 1-vector (U i , . . . , U N ), and u N i = (u i , . . . , u N ) is a specific vector value in U N i . Let p V (v) denote the probability mass function Pr{V = v}. Throughout the paper, the logarithmic function is to the base 2.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II provides the inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region of the model of Figure 1 . The capacity results in Section II are further explained via a degraded Gaussian example, which is shown in Section III. Final conclusions are in Section IV.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND THE MAIN RESULTS
The model of Figure 1 is a four-terminal discrete channel consisting of finite sets X, X 1 , Y , Y 1 , Z and a transition probability distribution p Y,Y 1 ,Z |X 1 ,X (y, y 1 , z|x 1 , x). X N and X N 1 are the channel inputs from the transmitter and the relay respectively, while Y N , Y N 1 , Z N are the channel outputs at receiver 1, relay and receiver 2, respectively. The channel is discrete memoryless, i.e., the channel outputs (y i , y 1,i , z i ) at time i only depend on the channel inputs (x i , x 1,i ) at time i .
Definition 1 (Channel Encoder): The confidential messages W 1 and W 2 take values in W 1 , W 2 , respectively. The common message W 0 takes values in W 0 . W 1 , W 2 and W 0 are independent and uniformly distributed over their ranges. The channel encoder is a stochastic encoder f E that maps the messages w 1 , w 2 and w 0 into a codeword x N ∈ X N . The transmission rates of the confidential messages (W 1 , W 2 ) and the common message (W 0 ) are log W 1 N , log W 2 N and log W 0 N , respectively. Definition 2 (Relay Encoder): The relay encoder is also a stochastic encoder ϕ i that maps the signals (y 1,1 , y 1,2 , . . . , y 1,i−1 ) received before time i to the channel input x 1,i .
Definition 3 (Decoder): The decoder for receiver 1 is a mapping f D1 : Y N → W 0 × W 1 , with input Y N and outputs W 0 ,W 1 . Let P e1 be the error probability of receiver 1, and it is defined as Pr{(W 0 ,
The decoder for receiver 2 is a mapping f D2 : Z N → W 0 × W 2 , with input Z N and outputs W 0 , W 2 . Let P e2 be the error probability of receiver 2, and it is defined as Pr{(W 0 ,
The equivocation rate at receiver 2 is defined as
Analogously, the equivocation rate at receiver 1 is defined as
> 0 (where is an arbitrary small positive real number and → 0), there exists a channel encoder-decoder (N, 1 , 2 , P e1 , P e2 ) such that
and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region R ( A) are provided from Theorem 1 to Theorem 3, and they are proved in Appendix A, Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively. Our first result establishes an outer-bound on the capacityequivocation region of the model of Figure 1 .
Theorem 1 (Outer Bound): A single-letter characterization of the region R ( Ao) (R ( A) ⊆ R ( Ao) ) is as follows,
Moreover, note that the outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of Figure 1 is the set of triples (R 0 ,
Proof: See Appendix A. Remark 1: There are some notes on Theorem 1, see the following.
The region R ( Ao) without the bounds on R e1 and R e2 can be served as an outer bound on the capacity region of the general relay broadcast channel.
We now turn our attention to constructing cooperation strategies for the model of Figure 1 . Our first step is to characterize the inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region by using Cover-El Gamal's Decode and Forward (DF) Strategy [10] . In our DF strategy, the relay node will first decode the common message, and then re-encode the common message to cooperate with the transmitter. The superposition coding and random binning techniques used in [6] will be combined with the DF cooperation strategy to characterize the inner bound. Note that the DF inner bound of [18] is obtained by allowing the relay to decode both the confidential and common messages. In general, for these two DF strategies, we do not know which one is better. In Section III, we show that for the degraded Gaussian relay-eavesdropper 1 channel, in some particular cases, our DF strategy performs better than that of [18] .
Theorem 2 (Inner Bound 1: DF Strategy): A single-letter characterization of the region R ( Ai1) (R ( Ai1) ⊆ R ( A) ) is as 1 Here "eavesdropper" is another name for "wiretapper." follows,
Moreover, note that the DF inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of Figure 1 is the set of triples
Proof: See Appendix B. The second step is to characterize the inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region by using the generalized noise and forward (GNF) strategy. In the GNF strategy, the relay node does not attempt to decode the messages but sends codewords that are independent of the transmitters messages, and these codewords aid in confusing the less capable receiver. Specifically, if the channel from the relay to receiver 1 is more capable than the channel from the relay to receiver 2, only receiver 1 is allowed to decode the relay codeword, and vice versa. Here note that the NF strategies of [18] and [19] only consider the case that there is no confidential message for the receiver 2, and thus confusing receiver 1 is not needed, i.e., if the channel from the relay to receiver 2 is more capable than the channel from the relay to receiver 1, we allow both or none of the receivers to decode the relay codeword. It is easy to see that our GNF strategy is a generalization of the NF strategies in [18] and [19] for the single confidential message case.
Theorem 3 (Inner Bound 2: GNF Strategy): A single-letter characterization of the region R ( Ai2) (R ( Ai2) ⊆ R ( A) ) is as follows,
where L 1 is given by
L 2 is given by
Moreover, note that the GNF inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of Figure 1 is the set of triples (R 0 ,
III. DEGRADED RELAY BROADCAST CHANNEL WITH ONE COMMON AND ONE CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES
In this section, the capacity results on the discrete memoryless degraded relay broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages are provided in Subsection III-A, the capacity results on the degraded Gaussian case are shown in Subsection III-B, the numerical results are in Subsection III-C, and the comparison of our proposed relay strategies and previous known strategies is shown in Subsection III-D.
A. Discrete Memoryless Degraded Relay Broadcast Channel With One Common and One Confidential Messages
The degraded relay broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages is a special case of the model of Figure 1 . and it implies the existence of a Markov chain
Since the received symbols Z N of receiver 2 are degraded versions of those of receiver 1, there is no confidential message W 2 . The channel encoder is a stochastic encoder that maps the messages w 0 and w 1 into a codeword x N ∈ X N . Moreover, the decoder for receiver 1 is a mapping f D1 : Y N → W 0 × W 1 , with input Y N and outputš W 0 andW 1 . Let P e1 be the error probability of receiver 1, and it is defined as Pr{(W 0 ,W 1 ) = (W 0 , W 1 )}. Analogously, the decoder for receiver 2 is a mapping f D2 : Z N → W 0 , with input Z N and outputŴ 0 . Let P e2 be the error probability of receiver 2, and it is defined as
is called achievable if, for any > 0 (where is an arbitrary small positive real number and → 0), there exists a channel encoder-decoder (N, , P e1 , P e2 ) such that
The capacity-equivocation region R (C) is a set composed of all achievable (R 0 , R 1 , R e ) triples. The inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region R (C) are provided from Theorem 4 to Theorem 6, see the remainder of this subsection. The first result is an outer bound on the capacity-equivocation region R (C) .
Here note that the outer bound on the secrecy capacity region of
Proof: See Appendix D. Remark 2: There are some notes on Theorem 4, see the following.
• In fact, we can directly obtain an outer bound R (Co * ) on R (C) by substituting V 2 = U (here V 2 = U is from the definition that V 2 = (U, W 2 ) and W 2 = const) and R 2 = R e2 = 0 into Theorem 1. However, we find that a tighter outer bound may be obtained by using the degradedness assumption
, with the help of the degradedness assumption, we can remove the auxiliary random variable U 2 , simplify the bounds on R 0 and R 0 + R 1 , and obtain a new upper bound
it is easy to see that the equivocation bound of R (Co) is tighter than that of R (Co * ) . • Letting R 0 = 0 and R e = R 1 , and observing that
an outer bound C Co s on the secrecy capacity C C s of the discrete memoryless degraded relay broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages is given by
Note that the degraded relay broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages reduces to the degraded relay-eavesdropper channel [18] when there is no common message (R 0 = 0). We also notice that in [18, Th. 5] , the secrecy capacity of a kind of physically degraded relay-eavesdropper channel has been determined. However, we find that the degradedness assumption of [18, Th. 5] is (X,
which is different from that of this paper. The secrecy capacity of the degraded relay-eavesdropper channel (with the degradedness assumption X → (X 1 , Y 1 ) → Y ) is still unknown. Now we turn to the inner bounds on the capacityequivocation region R (C) . The following Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 provide the decode-and-forward (DF) and noiseand-forward (NF) inner bounds on R (C) , respectively.
Note that the DF inner bound on the secrecy capacity region is denoted as C Ci1 s , which is the set of pairs
is directly obtained from Theorem 2. Thus, the proof is omitted here.
Remark 3: Letting R 0 = 0 and R e = R 1 , the DF inner bound C Ci1 s on the secrecy capacity C C s is given by
Here note that C Ci1 s is obtained by allowing the relay to decode the common message which is represented by U , and the relay is not allowed to decode the confidential message represented by V . We notice that Lai and El Gamal [18, Th. 2] also presents an DF inner bound C Ci * s on the secrecy capacity of the relay-eavesdropper channel, which can also be viewed as an DF inner bound on C C s , and it is given by
The bound C Ci1 * s is obtained by allowing the relay to decode both the confidential message represented by V 1 and the common message represented by U . In general, for these two bounds (C Ci1 s and C Ci1 * s ), we do not know which one is larger. In Subsection III-D, we present a Gaussian example and show that in some particular cases, C Ci1 s is larger than C Ci1 * s .
Theorem 6 (Inner Bound 2: NF Strategy): A single-letter characterization of the region R
where L 3 is given by
L 4 is given by
Note that the NF inner bound on the secrecy capacity region is denoted as C Ci2 s , and it is the set of pairs
Proof: • The region L 3 implies that the rate of the relay is
, which means that receiver 1 is able to decode the relay codeword x N 1 , and receiver 2 can not decode it. Therefore, in this case, x N 1 can be viewed as a noise signal to confuse receiver 2. By letting
Thus, the detail of the proof is omitted here. • For the region L 4 , the rate of the relay is
, which implies that both the receivers can decode the relay codeword x N 1 , and in this case, x N 1 serves as a common message decoded by both receivers. Thus, the achievability proof of the region L 4 is along the lines of the proof of the broadcast channel with confidential messages [3] , and we omit the proof here. Remark 4: There are some notes on Theorem 6, see the following.
• The auxiliary random variable U of Theorem 6 represents the common message W 0 . Letting U = const and R e = R 1 , Theorem 6 can be served as an achievable secrecy rate C Ci2 s for the general relay-eavesdropper channel [18] (without the degradedness assumption), and it is given as follows.
-
(3.8)
Here note that (3.7) and (3.8) can be combined as
We also notice that Lai for these special cases, we have the following comments.
-For the weak interference/eavesdropping (which implies that I (X; Y |X 1 ) ≥ I (X; Z |X 1 ) and
As stated above, we have shown that C Ci2 s = C Ci2 * s . For the weak interference/eavesdropping, we have
Comparing (3.10) with (3.11) , it is easy to see that C Ci2
From (3.7), (3.8) and the definition of the strong interference/eavesdropping, we also have
It is easy to see that C Ci2
B. Degraded Gaussian Relay Broadcast Channel With One Common and One Confidential Messages
In this subsection, we investigate the bounds on the secrecy capacity region of the degraded Gaussian relay broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages. The signal received at each node is given by
and they are independent. The average power constraints of X N and X N 1 are 1 
(3.16)
Proof: The region C Cgi1 s is obtained by substituting X = U + V , U = c 1 X 1 + X 10 , (3.14) and
Here note that X 10 is independent of X 1 , and V is independent of U .
Second, the NF inner bound on C Cg s is considered into the following two cases:
Proof: The region (3.17) is obtained by substituting X = U + V , (3.14) and R e = R 1 into L 3 , where V ∼ N (0, (1 − α)P 1 ), U ∼ N (0, αP 1 ), and X 1 , U and V are independent random variables. Here note that
where A is given by 19) and B is given by
The region A is the same as that of case 1, and the region B is obtained by substituting X = U + V , (3.14) and R e = R 1 into L 4 . Thus, the proof is completed. Third, the outer bound (C 
Proof: Substituting (3.14) and R e = R 1 into Theorem 4, and using the entropy power inequality, we have the outer bound (3.21). Thus, the proof is omitted.
Finally, remember that [4] provides the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian broadcast channel with one confidential message and one common message (GBCC), and it is given by 
C. Numerical Results
The following Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the inner and outer bounds on C Cg s and the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian BCC for several values of P 1 , P 2 , N r , N 1 and N 2 . Specifically, in Figure 2 , we choose P 1 = 5, P 2 = 20, N 1 = 2, N 2 = 8 and N r = 2, which implies that N 2 ≥ N 1 + P 1 . For this case, the NF inner bound on C Cg s reduces to the region of case 1. Compared with the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian BCC, it is easy to see that the maximum secrecy rate R 1 of C G BCC s is enhanced by using the NF strategy. For the DF strategy, though it can not increase the maximum R 1 of C G BCC s , the maximum common rate R 0 and the entire secrecy capacity region C G BCC s are enhanced. In Figure 3 , we choose P 1 = 10, P 2 = 20, N 1 = 2, N 2 = 8 and N r = 2, which implies that N 2 < N 1 + P 1 . For this case, the NF inner bound on C Cg s reduces to the region of case 2. Compared with the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian BCC, it is easy to see that the maximum secrecy rate R 1 of C G BCC s is enhanced by using the NF strategy. However, when R 0 is larger than 0.26, the NF strategy makes no contribution to enhance the security of the Gaussian BCC. For the DF strategy, it enhances the maximum common rate R 0 and the entire secrecy capacity region C G BCC s . Moreover, from Figure 2 and Figure 3 , we can see that there is a huge gap between the inner and outer bounds on C Cg s . Eliminating the gap is our future work.
D. The Comparison of the DF and NF Achievable Secrecy Rates With the Previous Known Results
In this subsection, we study the achievable secrecy rates of the degraded Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel. First, we show the DF and NF achievable secrecy rates of the degraded Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel. Then, we compare our DF secrecy rate with that of [18, p. 4009] , and show that in some particular cases, our result is better than Lai 1) Comparison of the DF Achievable Secrecy Rates of the Degraded Gaussian Relay-Eavesdropper Channel: In the previous subsection, we have already shown that the DF inner bound on the secrecy capacity region of the degraded Gaussian relay broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages is given by (3.16) . Letting α = 1 (which implies that the auxiliary random variable U = const and R 0 = 0), (3.16) can be served as our DF achievable secrecy rate C Cgi1 s for the degraded Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel, and it is given by
In the Remark 3, we have already shown that for the discrete memoryless case, Lai-El Gamal's DF achievable secrecy rate is given by (3.6) .
, straightforward calculations of (3.6) result in the degraded Gaussian DF achievable secrecy rate C Cgi1 * s , and it is given by
Comparing (3.23) with (3.24), we can conclude that
The following Figure 4 shows 2
) Comparison of the NF Achievable Secrecy Rates of the Degraded Gaussian Relay-Eavesdropper Channel:
In the Remark 4, we have already shown that for the discrete memoryless case, our and Lai-El Gamal's NF achievable secrecy rates can be characterized by (3.9) . Letting V = X, X ∼ N (0, P 1 ) and X 1 ∼ N (0, P 2 ), straightforward calculations of (3.9) result in the degraded Gaussian NF achievable secrecy rates C Cgi2 s and C Cgi2 * s , and they are given by the following cases: for P 1 = 5, P 2 = 8, N 1 = 2 and N r = 4. It is easy to see that the secrecy rates are increasing while the noise variance N 2 of the eavesdropper's channel is increasing, and when N 2 ≤ N 1 , no positive secrecy rate can be achieved.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provide inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation of RBC-CM. The capacity results are further explained via the degraded Gaussian relay broadcast channel with one common and one confidential messages. Numerical results show that a trusted relay node helps to enhance the security of the Gaussian BCC. Moreover, for the degraded Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel, we find that in some particular cases, our DF strategy is better than that of [18] . As for the NF strategies, we find that the NF strategies of [18] and [19] and this paper perform the same.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we will prove Theorem 1: all the achievable (R 0 , R 1 , R 2 , R e1 , R e2 ) quintuples are contained in the set R Ao . The inequalities of Theorem 1 are proved in the remainder of this section. First, define the following auxiliary random variables,
where J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over
where (a) is from Fano's inequality, (b) is from the fact that J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , N}), and it is independent of Y N , Y N 1 , Z N , W 0 , W 1 and W 2 , (c) is from J is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . , N}, the definitions of the auxiliary random variables (see (A1)), and P e1 ≤ . By using → 0,
where (a) is from (A1). By using → 0, R 0 = lim N→∞
Analogously, we can prove the other bounds on R 0 , R 0 + R 1 and R 0 + R 2 .
(
where (a) is from Fano's inequality. The character
Here note that the second term of the last step of (A5) is equal to the first term of the last step of (A6), and the proof is similar to that of Csiszár-Körner's equality [3] . Thus we omit the proof here. Substituting (A5) and (A6) into (A4), we have
where (1) is from the definitions of the auxiliary random variables (see (A1)). By using → 0,
Analogously, we can prove
The bounds on the equivocations R e1 and R e2 are almost the same as those of [6] , and thus, we omit the proof here. Thus, the proof of Theorem 1 is completed.
The coding scheme combines the decode and forward (DF) strategy [10] , random binning, superposition coding, block Markov coding and rate splitting techniques. The rate splitting technique is typically used in the interference channels to achieve a larger rate region as it enables interference cancellation at the receivers. Now we use it to split the confidential message W 1 into W 10 
Code Construction: For arbitrary > 0, define
(A11)
• First, generate at random 2 N R r i.i.d. sequences at the relay node each drawn according to p X N
Encoding: Encoding involves the mapping of message indices to channel inputs, which are facilitated by the sequences generated above. We exploit the block Markov coding scheme, as argued in [10] , the loss induced by this scheme is negligible as the number of blocks n → ∞. For block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), encoding proceeds as follows.
First, for convenience, define w * 0,i = (w 0,i , w 10,i , w 20,i ), where w 0,i , w 10,i and w 20,i are the messages transmitted in the i -th block. The messages w 11 and w 22 transmitted in the i -th block are denoted by w 11,i and w 22,i , respectively.
Channel Encoder: 1, 1, 1|a n−1 , 1) , v N 2 (1, 1, 1|a n−1 , 1) ) at block n. Here i i , i i , i i , j i , j i and j i are the indexes for block i .
2) In the i -th block (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the indexes i i , i i , j i and j i are determined by the following methods.
• If R 11 ≤ L 11 + L 12 , define W 11 = I × K 1 .
Thus the index i i is determined by a given message w 11,i . Evenly partition I into K 1 bins, and the index i i is drawn at random (with uniform distribution) from the bin k 1 . Analogously, if
Thus the index j i is determined by a given message w 22,i . Evenly partition J into K 2 bins, and the index j i is drawn at random (with uniform distribution) from the bin k 2 .
Thus the indexes i i and i i are determined by a given message w 11,i . Evenly partition I into K 1 bins, and the codeword v N 1 (i i , i i , i i |a i−1 , w * 0,i ) will be drawn from the bin k 1 .
Thus the indexes j i and j i are determined by a given message w 22,i . Evenly partition J into K 2 bins, and the codeword v N 2 ( j i , j i , j i |a i−1 , w * 0,i ) will be drawn from the bin k 2 .
3)
After the determination of i i , i i , j i and j i , the transmitter tries to find a pair
are jointly typical. If there are more than one such pair, randomly choose one; if there is no such pair, an error is declared. Thus, all the indexes of v N 1 and v N 2 (in block i ) are determined. One can show that such a pair exists with high probability for sufficiently large N if (see [11] )
4) In the i -th block (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the transmitter finally sends x N (a i−1 , w 0,i , w 10,i , w 20,i , w 11,i , w 22,i ).
Relay Encoder: The relay sends x N 1 (1) at the first block, and x N 1 (â i−1 ) from block 2 to n. Decoding: Decoding proceeds as follows. 1) (At the relay) At the end of block i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the relay already has an estimation of the a i−1 (denoted asâ i−1 ), which was sent at block i − 1, and will declare that it receivesâ i , if this is the only triple such that (u N (ŵ * 0,i |â i−1 ), x N 1 (â i−1 ), y N 1 (i )) are jointly typical. Here note that y N 1 (i ) indicates the output sequence y N 1 in block i , andâ i is the index of the bin thatŵ * 0,i belongs to. Based on the AEP, the probability Pr{â i = a i } goes to 1 if R 0 + R 10 + R 20 ≤ I (U ; Y 1 |X 1 ).
2) (At receiver 1) Receiver 1 decodes from the last block, i.e., block n. Suppose that at the end of block n − 1, the relay decodes successfully, then receiver 1 will declare thatǎ n−1 is received if (x N 1 (ǎ n−1 ), y N (n)) jointly typical. After gettinǧ a n−1 , receiver 1 can get an estimation of a i (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2) in a similar way. Havingǎ i−1 , receiver 1 can get the estimation of the message w * 0,i = (w 0,i , w 10,i , w 20,i ) by finding a unique triple such that (u N (w * 0,i |ǎ i−1 ), x N 1 (ǎ i−1 ), y N (i )) are jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the probability Pr{w * 0,i = w * 0,i } goes to 1 if R 0 + R 10 + R 20 − R r ≤ I (U ; Y |X 1 ). After decodingw * 0,i , receiver 1 tries to find a quadruple such that
, y N (i )) are jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the probability Pr{w 11,i = w 11,i } goes to 1 if R 11 
exists and is unique, seť i i = i i ,ǐ i = i i andǐ i = i i ; otherwise, declare an error. From the values ofǐ i ,ǐ i ,ǐ i , and the above encoding schemes, receiver 1 can calculate the messagew 11,i .
(At receiver 2) The decoding scheme for receiver 2 is symmetric, and it is omitted here. Analogously, we have R 0 + R 10 + R 20 − R r ≤ I (U ; Z |X 1 ), and R 22 ≤ I (V 2 ; Z |U, X 1 ).
By using the above encoding-decoding scheme, it is easy to check that P e1 ≤ and P e2 ≤ . Moreover, applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination on the above inequalities with the definitions R 1 = R 10 + R 11 and R 2 = R 20 + R 22 , Theorem 2 without the equivocation constraint is proved. Now, it remains to prove
, (A12) where (a) follows from the fact that given U N , W 10 is uniquely determined.
Consider the first term in (A12), the codeword generation ensures that
where δ is small for sufficiently large N.
For the second and third terms in (A12), using the same approach as that in [3, Lemma 3], we get
where , → 0 as N → ∞. Now, we consider the last term of (A12). For the case that R 11 ≤ L 11 + L 12 , given U N , X N 1 , V N 2 and W 11 , the total number of possible codewords of V N 1 is
By using the Fano's inequality and (A16), we have
where → 0. For the case that L 11 + L 12 ≤ R 11 ≤ L 11 + L 12 + L 3 , given U N , X N 1 , V N 2 and W 11 , V N 1 is totally determined, and therefore
Substituting (A13), (A14), (A15) and (A17) (or (A18)) into (A12), and using the definition (2.3), we have
. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We consider the proof of Theorem 3 for the case I (X 1 ; Y ) ≥ I (X 1 ; Z |U, V 2 ), and the proof for I (X 1 ; Z ) ≥ I (X 1 ; Y |U, V 1 ) follows by symmetry. Now we will prove that the quintuple with the conditions R e1 = min{I (
, is achievable. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we split the confidential message W 1 into W 10 and W 11 , and W 2 into W 20 and W 22 , and the definitions of these messages are the same as those in Appendix B. Here note that R 11 ≥ R e1 and R 22 ≥ R e2 .
First, generate at random 2 N R r i.i.d. sequences at the relay node each drawn according to p X N
Here note that
Similarly, for the transmitted sequences u N and x N 1 , gener-
Encoding: Similar to the definitions in Appendix B, define w * 0,i = (w 0,i , w 10,i , w 20,i ), where w 0,i , w 10,i and w 20,i are the messages transmitted in the i -th block. The messages w 11 and w 22 transmitted in the i -th block are denoted by w 11,i and w 22,i , respectively.
Channel Encoder:
Here i i , i i , i i , j i , j i and j i are the indexes for block i .
2) The indexes i i , i i , j i and j i are determined by the following methods.
• If R 11 ≤ L 11 , evenly partition I into W 11 bins, and the index i i is drawn at random (with uniform distribution) from the bin w 11 . The index i i is drawn at random (with uniform distribution) from I . Note that R 22 always satisfies R 22 ≥ L 21 . • If L 11 ≤ R 11 ≤ L 11 + L 12 , define W 11 = I × K 1 . Thus the index i i is determined by a given message w 11,i . Evenly partition I into K 1 bins, and the index i i is drawn at random (with uniform distribution) from the bin k 1 .
• If L 11 + L 12 ≤ R 11 ≤ L 11 + L 12 + L 3 , define W 11 = I × I × K 1 . Thus the indexes i i and i i are determined by a given message w 11,i . Evenly partition I into K 1 bins, and the codeword v N 1 (i i , i i , i i |w * 0,i ) will be drawn from the bin k 1 .
Thus the indexes j i and j i are determined by a given message w 22,i . Evenly partition J into K 2 bins, and the codeword v N 2 ( j i , j i , j i |w * 0,i ) will be drawn from the bin k 2 .
3) After the determination of i i , i i , j i and j i , the transmitter tries to find a pair
) are jointly typical. If there are more than one such pair, randomly choose one; if there is no such pair, an error is declared. Thus, all the indexes of v N 1 and v N 2 (in block i ) are determined. One can show that such a pair exists with high probability for sufficiently large N if
Relay Encoder: In the i -th block, the relay uniformly picks a codeword x N 1 (a i ) from a i ∈ [1, 2 N R r ], and sends x N 1 (a i ). Decoding: Decoding proceeds as follows.
(At receiver 1) At the end of block i , receiver 1 will declare thatǎ i is received if (x N 1 (ǎ i ), y N (i )) are jointly typical. Havingǎ i , receiver 1 can get the estimation of the message w * 0,i = (w 0,i , w 10,i , w 20,i ) by finding a unique triple such that (u N (w * 0,i ), x N 1 (ǎ i ), y N (i )) are jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the probability Pr{w * 0,i = w * 0,i } goes to 1 if R 0 + R 10 + R 20 ≤ I (U ; Y |X 1 ). After decodingw * 0,i , receiver 1 tries to find a quadruple such that
, y N (i )) are jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the probability Pr{w 11,i = w 11,i } goes to 1 if R 11 ≤ I (V 1 ; Y |U, X 1 ). If such v N 1 (ǐ i ,ǐ i ,ǐ i |w * 0,i ) exists and is unique, setǐ i = i i ,ǐ i = i i andǐ i = i i ; otherwise, declare an error. From the values ofǐ i ,ǐ i ,ǐ i , and the above encoding schemes, receiver 1 can calculate the messagew 11,i .
(At receiver 2) Receiver 2 gets the estimation of the message w * 0,i by finding a unique pair such that (u N (ŵ * 0,i ), z N (i )) are jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the probability Pr{ŵ * 0,i = w * 0,i } goes to 1 if R 0 + R 10 + R 20 ≤ I (U ; Z ). After decodingŵ * 0,i , receiver 2 tries to find a triple such that
are jointly typical. Based on the AEP, the probability Pr{ŵ 22,i = w 22,i } goes to 1 if R 22 ≤ I (V 2 ; Z |U ). If such v N 2 (ĵ i ,ĵ i ,ĵ i |ŵ * 0,i ) exists and is unique, setĵ i = j i ,ĵ i = j i andĵ i = j i ; otherwise, declare an error. From the values ofĵ i ,ĵ i ,ĵ i , and the above encoding schemes, receiver 2 can calculate the messageŵ 22,i .
By using the above encoding-decoding scheme, it is easy to check that P e1 ≤ and P e2 ≤ . Moreover, applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination on the above inequalities with the definitions R 1 = R 10 + R 11 and R 2 = R 20 + R 22 , Theorem 3 without the equivocation constraint is proved. Now, it remains to prove lim N→∞ 1 ≥ R e1 and lim N→∞ 2 ≥ R e2 . 1 is N 1 ≤ 2 N L 12 = 2 N I (V 1 ;Z |U,V 2 ) . Thus, by using the Fano's inequality, we have
Given U N , V N 1 , V N 2 and W 11 , the total number of possible codewords of X N 1 is N 2 ≤ 2 N R r = 2 N(min{I (X 1 ;Y ),I (X 1 ;Z |V 1 ,V 2 ,U )}− ) . Thus by using Fano's inequality, we have
By using (A29) and (A30),
is guaranteed. For the case that L 11 + L 12 ≤ R 11 ≤ L 11 + L 12 + L 3 , given U N , V N 2 and W 11 , V N 1 is totally determined, and therefore
Similarly, note that R r = min{I (X 1 ; Z |U, V 1 , V 2 ), I (X 1 ; Y )} − , by using Fano's inequality, we have (A30).
is guaranteed.
Substituting (A25), (A26), (A27) and (A28) (or (A31), (A33)) into (A24), and using the definition (2.3), we have
Proof of li m N→∞ 2 
where (a) follows from the fact that given U N , W 20 is uniquely determined, and (b) is from that X N 1 is independent of V N 1 , V N 2 and U N . For the first term in (A34), we have
where δ 3 is small for sufficiently large N.
For the second and third terms in (A34), using the same approach as that in [3, Lemma 3], we get
and
where , → 0 as N → ∞. Now, we consider the last term of (A34).
• For the case that R 22 ≤ L 21 + L 22 , given U N , V N 1 and W 22 , the total number of possible codewords of V N 2 is
By using the Fano's inequality and (A38), we have
where → 0. • For the case that L 21 + L 22 ≤ R 22 ≤ L 21 + L 22 + L 3 , given U N , V N 1 and W 22 , V N 2 is totally determined, and therefore
Substituting (A35), (A36), (A37) and (A39) (or (A40)) into (A34), and using the definition (2.3), we have lim N→∞ 2 ≥ R e2 = I (V 2 ; Z |U ) − I (V 1 ; V 2 |U ) − I (V 2 ; Y |U, X 1 , V 1 ). This completes the proof for Theorem 3.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 4
The auxiliary random variables in R (Co) are defined by
where J is a random variable (uniformly distributed over  {1, 2, , . . . , N}) , and it is independent of X N , X N 1 , Y N , Y N 1 , Z N , W 0 and W 1 . From the above definitions, it is easy to see that the relay X 1 is represented by the auxiliary random variables Q. The common message W 0 is represented by U , and the confidential message W 1 is represented by V . Now it remains to prove the inequalities of Theorem 4, see the followings.
Proof of R 0 ≤ mi n{I (U, Q; Z), I (U; Y 1 |Q)}: Note that
where (1) is from Fano's inequality, and (2) is from the above definitions of U , Q and Z . Also note that
= I (U ; Y 1 , Z |Q) + δ( ) N (6) = I (U ;
where (3) is from Fano's inequality, (4) is from the Markov 
where (1) is from Fano's inequality, and (2) is from the above definitions of U , V , Q and Y . Also note that 1 N H (W 0 , W 1 )
where (3) is from Fano's inequality, (4) is from the definitions of U , V , Q, Y 1 and Y , and (5) is from the Markov chain
Letting N → ∞ and using lim N→∞
Proof of R e ≤ I (V ; Y |U) − I (V ; Z|U): Note that the definitions of U and V are the same as those of [3] , and therefore, the proof of R e ≤ I (V ; Y |U ) − I (V ; Z |U ) is the same as that of [3] . Thus, we omit the proof here.
Proof of R e ≤ I (V ; Y 1 |U, Q) − I (V ; Z |U, Q): First, note that 1 N H (W 1 |Z N )
where (a) and (b) are from Fano's inequality, (c) is from the Markov chain
, (e) is from the fact that given Q i , U i , Y i , Z i and Y 1,i , V i is independent of X 1,i , and the Markov chains 1,i , and (f) is from the above definitions of U , Q, V , Y 1 and Z , and note that J is a time sharing random variable. Letting N → ∞ and using lim N→∞ 
